For many Western analysts, China’s response to the Iran crisis seems to confirm a familiar verdict: Beijing is an unreliable friend. It buys Iranian oil, denounces unilateral military action, calls for restraint—and then stops short of doing what they believe a great power should do for a partner under pressure: come to its aid militarily, either directly or through supplying arms and funding.

It is certainly true that China is not willing to play the same role for Iran that the United States has long assumed for its own partners. But that does not mean that China is feckless, nor does it mean that its ties with Iran are insincere. It means, above all, that too many observers still measure every rising power against a U.S. template.

In Washington, power is still read through the grammar of alliances, security guarantees, and the conversion of political relationships into military obligations. Once that template is assumed to be universal, any refusal to act as a military patron becomes evidence of weakness. Yet Beijing has never organized power quite that way—and the reasons are not reducible to a single cynical calculation. (...)

It did not export its system anywhere else. It succeeded beyond US expectations and the US is jealous to the point of rage.